Three basic instincts. Innate human instincts. Maintaining your dignity

A person is not born helpless and unable to do anything. It’s just that his body after birth is not yet formed enough to be able to perform all the basic actions that are characteristic of all people. Instincts are basic actions that are performed by absolutely all people. To understand what it is, how it affects our lives and what examples can be given, the online magazine site will consider this topic.

Absolutely all people are born with instincts. These are unconditioned reflexes that appear in all living beings and perform important functions. Among all types of instincts, the most important are the sense of self-preservation and reproduction. The desire to preserve one’s life manifests itself from the first minutes of life. The child screams, cries to be fed, warmed, lulled, etc.

As the human body strengthens and becomes independently functioning, the child is increasingly exposed to instincts. A striking example is the ability of pediatricians to tell parents at what month of their life what a child should do in order to be considered normally developing. During the first years of life, all children live at the level of instincts, which dictate to them how they will develop, what to do, how to react, how their bodies will act, etc.

However, instincts are not everything on which human life is based, otherwise people would not be different from the animal world. If animals act at the level of instincts, then people, as they develop and grow, acquire conditioned reflexes - these are certain skills that require training and consolidation in order to perform them. People are not born with these skills. If a person is not taught them, he will not be able to perform them. However, as education progresses, instincts increasingly fade into the background, giving way to conditioned reflexes.

Instincts cannot be suppressed or completely eliminated. However, a person is able to stop himself and control himself in time. If you exercise control over your own actions, then your instincts will not be able to manifest themselves in full force. The person will experience instinctual experiences and manifestations (such as a racing heart or sweating), but can control their actions.

Instincts are usually triggered in urgent and life-threatening situations. An example is an attack by a dog, from which a person wants to run away or fights off with stones, or withdrawing a hand from a hot kettle (it is unlikely that anyone will be able to avoid doing this, unless the person has impairments in the perception of analyzers or the processing of incoming information by the brain).

Instincts are always fully triggered when a person does not control himself. However, here it is necessary to distinguish between automatically acquired actions and instincts. The fact that a person does not think about the fact that he needs to raise his hand to turn on the light in the room does not make his actions instinctive.

A person’s instincts do not need to be taught; he already possesses them and obeys them if he does not try to stop his actions. A person must learn automatic conditioned reflexes and other behaviors in order to perform them.

What are instincts?

Instincts are understood as automatic, conditioned actions that are given to all people from birth and do not require their conscious control. Basically, instincts are aimed at the survival of the individual and the preservation of their species. Thus, a person instinctively begins to look for food or water when he is hungry or thirsty, runs away from danger or enters into battle when he is in danger, and has sexual relations with the opposite sex in order to obtain offspring.

However, psychologists point out that humans have many more instincts than the animal world. Human instincts are the desire for power, dominance, and communication. It should be noted that the most important instinct, which has many forms of manifestation, is the desire to maintain balance. The so-called homeostasis - when a person wants to experience peace and tranquility - is one of the basic aspirations.

Instinct is not a goal, as some people might think. The fact that a person consciously desires and wants to achieve something is not an instinct. Here a person simply arranges his life, which can exist anyway if he does nothing.

It is necessary to distinguish instincts from internal fears, complexes, feelings that develop in a person as he lives. They are also called acquired or social fears. For example, the feeling of guilt is an acquired quality that affects a person at a subconscious level. However, no one is born with a feeling of guilt; it is developed in people as they grow and develop.

You should also highlight such common fears as:

  1. Fear of not being recognized.
  2. Fear of criticism.
  3. etc.

These are all social fears. They are more related to a person’s mental harmony than to his survival.

However, there are fears that to some extent can be attributed to instinctive. Thus, fear of sharks or spiders, fear of heights - these fears can be developed, but they are based on the instinct of self-survival, when a person must first of all take care of the safety of his health and life.

Human instincts

Man is a complex creature, which can be explained by the example of the transformation and complication of instincts over the course of his life. A person is born with biological needs that are dictated by instincts - automatic actions aimed at satisfying the needs of the body. However, a person lives in a society where there are its own rules, norms, traditions and other aspects. He is exposed to education, training, influence, which allows instincts to fade into the background.

Instincts do not disappear and do not disappear. Sometimes a person even learns to stop them and control them. As one gains experience and shapes one's life, a person's instincts transform. If you notice a person behaving inappropriately in a stressful situation, it means that he has not yet developed a mechanism that would restrain his instinctive behavior. However, there are individuals who have already learned to remain calm in situations that threaten them with death or require fertilization (sexual intercourse).

Thus, human instincts do not disappear anywhere, but they begin to obey certain fears, worldviews, conditioned reflexes and even social norms when an individual learns to get involved in the process in time to slow down his instinctive actions and quickly transfer them to other actions.

Instincts are given to absolutely all people and remain for life. They cannot be called either good or bad. Instincts help a person, first of all, to survive, otherwise his birth and existence become meaningless. On the other hand, instinctive actions are often considered unacceptable in a society where its own laws and frameworks of behavior have been developed. Therefore, a person must learn to control his instinctive impulses and transfer energy to perform actions acceptable by society.

This is what distinguishes humans from animals - conscious control, when instincts exist and continue to help a person survive. However, the individual is able to control himself and not obey instinctive energy if it is inappropriate in a particular case.

Types of instincts

There are many types of instincts:

  1. The instinct of self-preservation is the most basic and initial. Every child begins to cry if there is no mother or the person who constantly takes care of him nearby. If a person’s instinct of self-preservation does not fade away over time under the influence of public education, then he becomes cautious and prudent. Gambling, risky people commit destructive acts when they jump with a parachute or climb into the cages of predatory animals. Depending on the degree of self-preservation instinct, a person will perform certain actions.
  2. Continuation of the family. This instinct first manifests itself at the level of the desire for the parents’ family to remain intact and not be destroyed, and then the person himself begins to desire to create his own family and have children. This instinct also has different levels of manifestation. There are people who control their sexual desires and remain faithful to their only marriage partners, and there are people who are unwilling or unable to control sexual lust, so they take mistresses or do not create families at all in order to be able to copulate with a large number of members of the opposite sex .
  3. Study. As the human body gets stronger, it begins to study the world around it. Curiosity becomes an instinct that is aimed at studying the world around him, the desire to understand it and begin to interact with it, which will also allow him to live harmoniously and preserve his life.
  4. Dominance. A person experiences an internal need to have power, to lead other people, to control and manage. This instinct manifests itself in people to varying degrees.
  5. Independence and freedom. These instincts are also innate, when every child resists any attempt to swaddle him, limit his actions or prohibit him. Adults also do everything to gain maximum freedom and independence in the world in which they are forced to live.
  6. . This instinct can be combined with the instinct of research, since a person first studies the world around him, and then begins to adapt to it in order to develop such skills and form such knowledge that will help him effectively survive in the existing conditions.
  7. Communicative. A person can be alone, but he gravitates more towards a herd existence, when he can communicate, conduct joint business and solve problems at the expense of others.

Examples of instincts

The most striking examples of instincts are a person’s desire to flee or defend themselves in a situation of danger. Also, almost all people in one way or another want to continue their family line. It is impossible to call the feelings that parents show towards their child instincts, but their presence forces mothers and fathers to take care of their offspring until they become independent and independent from them.

Social instincts, that is, those that are developed throughout life, can be called a tendency towards altruism and the desire to maintain a sense of self-esteem.

Bottom line

Instincts are given to all people for only one purpose - to preserve the human race (first the person himself, and then to encourage him to reproduce and preserve his young). Instincts become dull over the years, as a person learns to control them or stop in time thanks to those conditioned actions that he develops over the course of his life.

Ethologists define instinct as a specialized morphostructure (an animal's temporary organ, Lorenz, 1950a, b), which naturally appears in the flow of the animal's actions in a specific social situation. Instinctive reaction = automatically carried out whenever specific stimuli are presented, regardless of the context, and is not corrected either by the circumstances of the context or by the past experience of the animal. Even if the use of both could greatly increase the success of the reaction, the implementation of instincts follows the species " innate response patterns».

That is, the main thing in the implementation of instinct, in contrast to reflex and other simple forms of response, is to implement specialized forms of behavior in specific situations of interaction stereotypically and accurately, and not just cause responses to stimulation.

Ethology was born from the brilliant insight of Oskar Heinroth, who suddenly “saw” that hereditary coordination, the center of inhibition standing above it and the triggering mechanism “form from the very beginning a certain functional whole” (Lorenz, 1998: 341 ). Having identified this system, Heinroth introduced the concept of “ characteristic of a type of impulsive behavior» ( arteigene Triebhandlung), which opened the way for " morphological approach to behavior». Arteigene Triebhandlung- the same “manner of behavior” by which an ornithologist unmistakably recognizes a species even before examining the details of coloration. Example: reactions of shaking the tail, characteristic movements during take-off, cleaning, etc. are so stable and typified that they have systematic significance (R. Hind. “Animal Behavior”, 1975: table 3 on page 709).

Another example of “species-specific impulsive behavior” is that many chickens, even when given a reward, could not stand quietly on the platform for just 10 seconds without moving their legs. They couldn't stand it anymore and started scraping the floor. Pigs in the circus easily learn to roll out a carpet with their snouts, but they cannot learn to take and put a coin into a porcelain piggy bank (also in the shape of a pig; this would make a spectacular circus act). Instead of putting the coin down, the pig drops it on the floor many times, pushes it with his snout, picks it up, drops it again, pushes it up, throws it up, etc.

Based on such observations, the Brelendas established principle of instinctive displacement: learned individual reactions are always shifted towards species instincts in cases where the learned reaction is at least to some extent similar to strong I. (Breland, Breland, 1961, cited by Reznikova, 2005).

It is the structure of the animal’s instinctive reactions that determines 1) what can be learned and what cannot be learned, 2) how learning should be organized in order for it to be successful, and the form of “learning” experience in the general case depends not on the logic of the task, but on the instinctively given “ spaces of opportunity” for learning a particular skill. 3) how the experiment should be carried out “on rational activity” in order to reveal the “upper floors” of the animal’s intelligence.

In humans and anthropoids, there is no instinctive bias: it is possible to learn any reaction (solving a problem, etc.) that individuals are able to reproduce according to a model. The training may be poor and the results low, but there is no observed shift to other reactions that could be considered potential “instincts” (Zorina Z.A., Smirnova A.A. What did the “talking monkeys” talk about? Are higher animals capable of operate with symbols. M. 2006).

Instincts differ from ordinary reflex acts in that they are reproduced not only directly in response to stimulation, but continuously. More precisely, the animal is in constant readiness to perform an instinctive action, but the latter is normally suppressed. Under the influence of key stimuli, central control is removed, releasing the specific structure of the instinctive act.

Erich von Holst obtained direct evidence that der Erbkoordination is a system with autonomous control, not reducible to chains of unconditioned reflexes. He discovered that the stereotypical movements of an animal are caused by processes of stimulation and coordination occurring in the nervous system itself. The movements are not only performed in a coordinated manner in a strict sequence without the participation of reflexes, but also begin without any external stimulus at all.

Thus, normal swimming movements of fish with cut dorsal roots of spinal nerves were recorded. The species-specific form of movements is determined by an autonomous mechanism from the inside, “triggered” in response to a key stimulus from the outside. In the long-term absence of specific stimuli, the same mechanism “works idle”, in response to the endogenous growth of unrealized excitation “within” the individual.

To minimize possible “launch errors” (after all, an instinctive action cannot be stopped or changed until it is fully implemented), the triggering system must somehow “compare” the external stimulus with a certain neural model of “typical stimuli” and/or “typical situations”, triggering an instinctive response. Consequently, the innate response system always contains an element of pattern recognition (Lorenz, 1989).

Instincts are the only “formulated structures” (stable elements of the organization of the process) that an “interested observer” - an ethologist or another animal (neighbor, active invader) can identify against the background of a changing continuum of direct actions or expressive reactions of an individual. The latter can be as innate as instincts, but are controlled by the goal through acceptors of the results of action according to P.K. Anokhin or are reflexive in nature, and do not implement (species) specific structures of a multi-stage sequence of actions, subordinate to a certain plan, program of behavior (Haase-Rappoport , Pospelov, 1987). Therefore, reflexes and expressive reactions, as well as the purposeful actions of an animal, are not part of the instincts, although they often accompany them.

Due to the pattern and “automaticity” of the action, the act of realizing instinct marks the onset of specific problematic situations of the process and therefore can and does serve as a sign of the latter. Stereotypical reproduction of differentiated forms of mating, threatening, etc. demonstrations in response to demonstrations of the same series is the realization of instinct in the communicative process. Therefore, to analyze instincts realized in social communication, ethologists use a “morphological approach to behavior.”

Ritualized demonstrations of animals are specific elements of the species instinct (protection of territory, but not “aggressive”, search for a partner or courtship, but not “sexual”, etc., depending on the specific biology of the species). More precisely, species-specific demonstrations are successive stages of the implementation of instinct in the communicative process, the most specific (species-specific), isolated and formalized elements of “species-specific impulsive behavior”, since they are specialized in relation to the signaling function. In accordance with this, Oscar Heinroth defined ethology as the study of the “language and rituals” of animals, united by him in the concept of “communication system”.

It is remarkable that psychologists of the cultural-historical school, based on completely different grounds, also define instincts as structures of behavior external to the acting individual, that is, “general species forms” of signaling and social action, into which the activity of the latter must fit in order to be effective and meaningful for partners.

« Instinct, this genetically primary form of behavior, is considered as a complex structure, the individual parts of which are composed like elements that form a rhythm, figure or melody”, that is, it is also characterized by a certain form, which has a certain signal meaning and which the partner must recognize.

This is a complex structure, a certain sign of some communication system, which partners recognize by “figures, rhythms or melodies” formed by elements of instinct, that is, by the specific organization of the instinctive sequence. Ethologists have yet to decipher this kind of “signs” in animals, for which they must learn to establish the corresponding “figures” and, especially, “melodies”, to distinguish them from the “background” of non-signal activity. methodological character.

And further " There is much to support the assumption that instinct is a genetic precursor to reflex. Reflexes are only residual, separated parts from more or less differentiated instincts"(Dictionary of L.S. Vygotsky, 2004: 44 ). This was written independently of Heinroth and Lorenz, and partly before them.

In the phylogenetic series of vertebrates, the “innate blank” of instinct becomes less and less and more uncertain, with an equally steady increase in the formative role of the social environment in the formation of normal behavior. When a certain boundary is crossed, the first one disappears completely, and behavior is formed only an individual understanding of the situation(the ability to create concepts and continue to act according to the selected ideal “model”) or social environment, educating and developing the abilities of individuals, including understanding and action, without the participation of instincts. An innate pattern of behavior, triggered in response to specific stimuli in a specific interaction situation - instinct here disappears, breaking up into isolated innate reactions - reflexes, exactly as in the definition of L.S. Vygotsky.

I think that this “Rubicon” of the disappearance of instincts lies not even between man and animals, but inside the monkeys themselves, somewhere between the higher and lower primates. monkeys, anthropoids and baboons, or macaques and monkeys.

A sign of the presence of such a boundary seems to me to be the destruction in higher apes of that system of differentiated species signals “like vervet monkeys”, which is so fashionable now, and the complete despecialization of signals, both vocalization and gesture. In higher primates, the manifestation of instincts “goes into the shadows” and is increasingly limited to uncertain and nonspecific situations.

This leads to the reverse transformation of the animal’s visual and acoustic demonstrations from signals about the situation into “simply expressions”, expressing the dynamics of the individual’s state, and not only in connection with the situation. Demonstrations lose their usual informativeness and specificity of connecting certain signals with certain situations. Analysis of hamadryas interactions ( Erythrocebus patas) showed that the basis for describing the conservative side of the social structure of a group is provided by the regulation of distances, grooming, sniffing the partner’s mouth and other individual decisions and actions. Demonstrations, despite their species specificity, mean surprisingly little: they not only occur in less than 13% of the total number of encounters, but also do not allow one to predict the outcome of the encounter between two individuals (Rowell and Olson, 1983).

The main means of regulating the social structure of groups of primates (to a lesser extent other higher mammals) instead general species signals serves social action of each individual interested in the stability of the existing structure of the group or, conversely, in changes in this structure that are beneficial for themselves. Species-wide expressions or vocalizations, usually pretending to be demonstrations - potential signals, are almost always non-specific in higher primates.

But social action and assessment of situations, seemingly purely individual, turns out to be generally understandable and easy to “read” for two reasons. First, it often turns out to be a typical action in typical circumstances, and the development of individuality in higher primates reaches the ability to create concepts of situations by observing the behavior of other individuals, and to reproduce these actions according to an ideal “pattern” when the same situation happens to an individual. observer This does not require species instincts, only individual abilities of observation, imagination, memory, and intellect, all of which are what distinguish the higher apes from the lower ones - colobus monkeys and monkeys.

Secondly, among higher primates, the ideal structure of the group exists as a certain common reality, known to all members of society, and taken into account in any social action, along with the status and individual characteristics of animals. Based on this “knowledge” of the “ideal model” of relationships that integrate animals into the community, the individual can himself predict the development of social situations and, of his own choice, take actions aimed at preserving existing social connections destroyed by the aggression of the dominant, or, conversely, changing them in their benefit (Seyfarth, 1980, 1981; Cheeney, Seyfarth, 2007).

It is clear that for effective management (or maintaining the existing structure of relations) in such a system there is no need for species instincts, and individual action is sufficient. After all, the ability to create concepts of a situation, the transferability of concepts and the ability to implement multi-stage action plans according to a certain ideal “model” observed in other individuals makes instinct completely unnecessary.

In apes, the instinctive “matrix” disappears completely, and patterns of species-specific behavior are indistinguishable among individual expressions. This applies equally to demonstrations (postures, gestures and sounds), and to somewhat stereotypical forms of everyday behavior.

Here (and even more so in humans) completely lacking instincts in the ethological understanding of this term, no matter how much it contradicts the everyday meaning of the word “instinct”, “instinctive”, where instinct is confused with stereotype and ritual on the basis of a general similarity in the “unconscious” implementation of an action.

In lower monkeys (monkeys, colobus monkeys, New World monkeys, all of which have differentiated systems of signal-symbols), they are certainly present. Consequently, in the “transition zone” between the first and second - in macaques, langurs, baboons, geladas, there is a gradual destruction of the instinctive “matrix” of behavior to a state of complete absence in anthropoids (which will be specified by primatological research; being an ornithologist, I can only note a trend I can only guess at the exact location of the border).

There are three lines of evidence in favor of this thesis.

Firstly, in lower vertebrates psyche And animal personality develop in a “matrix” of instincts, subordinating and taking control of other forms of activity. In almost all vertebrates, except for some birds and higher mammals (parrots, corvids, monkeys, dolphins, who else?), non-instinctive reactions either serve the implementation of instinct, or are carried out according to the “matrix” created by it for dividing time between different types of animal activity, or are subject to instinctive displacement. That is, it is the species instincts that set the “limits of implementation” of non-instinctive forms of behavior in time and space, the “goals”, and the “upper floors” of the development of intelligence (Nikolskaya et al., 1995; Nikolskaya, 2005).

In the process of progressive evolution of the individuality of an animal among vertebrates, this matrix “thinners” and “destroys”, being replaced by acts of individual intelligence(For example, concepts of situations), learning outcomes and other elements of experience. The manifestation of instincts “goes into the shadows” and is increasingly limited to uncertain and non-specific situations.

Further, an “instinctive matrix” of patterns of species-specific behavior has been described in studies of the neural substrate of vocalizations of lower apes, but has not been found in anthropoids. By stimulating different parts of the brain of squirrel monkeys using implanted electrodes, U.JurgensAndD.Plooge showed that each of the eight types of saimiri sounds, identified according to the structural characteristics of the spectrum, has its own morphological substrate in the vocal areas of the brain. If the substrates coincided and two different types of sounds could be evoked from one point, they were evoked by different modes of electrical stimulation (in terms of intensity, frequency and duration of the stimulus, cited by Jurgens, 1979, 1988).

Similar results were obtained in other species of lower apes. The differentiation of alarm signals at the level of behavior corresponds to the differentiation of the neural substrate that mediates the issuance of a signal in response to signals from a partner and/or dangerous situations (these are areas of the limbic system, which includes the vocal zones of the diencephalon and forebrain). With a common morphological substrate, different signals are “triggered” by different modes of stimulation, that is, each species-specific signal corresponds to its “own” site and/or triggering mode of influence (Fitch, Hauser, 1995; Ghazanfar, Hauser, 1999).

On the one hand, all this exactly corresponds to the “release” of instincts after specific “injections” of key stimuli, as classical ethologists understood it. On the other hand, it proves the discreteness and differentiation of species signals in lower apes and other vertebrates that have signaling systems of the same type (Evans, 2002; Egnor et al., 2004). Thirdly, it confirms the presence of a biological basis for the traditional typological classification of animal signals, based on reducing the entire variety of changes in the structural-temporal spectrum of sounds produced in a given situation to a certain finite set of “ideal samples” (Current topics in primate vocal communication, 1995).

That is, in the lower monkeys we see a hard “ triple match"between a signal, a situation and a pattern of behavior triggered in response to a signal, with the species-specificity of the patterns, the “automaticity” of the trigger, the innateness of the “meaning” of situations by signals and the innateness of the response of other individuals to the signal. Physiological studies show that signals have isolated “issue models” in the brain, ethological studies of the same types show that there are isolated “patterns of perception and response” of different signals associated with different situations and differentiated on the basis of different waveforms.

Alarm systems for all other vertebrates (rodents, lizards, birds and fish) are also organized. But in the phylogenetic series of primates, this “triple correspondence” weakens and is completely eliminated in anthropoids. Already in baboons and macaques, the accuracy of the correspondence between differentiated signals, morphological substrates from which the signal is evoked, and differentiated stimulation modes or classes of external objects responsible for the appearance of the signal is impaired (Current topics in primate vocal communication, 1995; Ghazanfar, Hauser, 1999).

Accordingly, many visual and acoustic demonstrations are non-specific, and are de-specialized to the level of individual pantomime. These entirely nonspecific signals are nevertheless quite effective in communicative terms, for example, the so-called “food cry” of Ceylon macaques ( Macaca sinica).

Having discovered a new type of food or a rich source of food, monkeys emit a characteristic cry lasting about 0.5 s (frequency ranges from 2.5 to 4.5 kHz). The emotional basis of the cry is general excitement, a kind of euphoria, stimulated by the discovery of new sources or types of food, where the level of excitement (reflected in the corresponding parameters of the cry) grows in proportion to the degree of novelty and “delicacy” of the food.

Evidence of the nonspecificity of the signal is the fact that individual differences in the reactivity of macaques significantly affect the intensity of sound activity and the frequency characteristics of the sounds themselves. In addition, the characteristics of the signal do not depend on the specific characteristics of food objects, that is, the macaque food signal is devoid of iconic meaning.

Nevertheless, the food cry is an effective and reliable means of communication. In an adequate situation, a cry was recorded in 154 cases out of 169. A positive reaction of other individuals to a cry was found in 135 cases out of 154; members of the herd who hear the cry run towards it from a distance of up to 100 m (Dittus, 1984).

During the transition to higher primates, more and more signals become nonspecific, their form is determined by individual expression, which is influenced by the state and situation, with the complete lack of expression of “ideal samples” and, therefore, invariants of the signal form. The reaction is determined by an individual assessment of the situation, and not by “automatisms” at the species level; differentiated species signaling systems “like vervet monkeys” are transformed into pantomime of individuals (signals ad hoc), which each animal emits to the extent of its own excitement and its specific assessment of the situation, and others interpret to the extent of their own observation and understanding.

That is, in the phylogenetic series of primates, there is a despecialization of species signals: from a specialized “language” using symbolic signals, they turn into an individual pantomime, capable of conveying a mood, but not informing about a class of situations. This process has been recorded for both vocalizations and visual signals (facial expressions, gestures, postural demonstrations). It reaches its logical conclusion in the anthropoids. Their behavioral repertoire completely lacks elements of behavior corresponding to the “demonstrations” of classical ethologists.

Their place is taken by vocalizations, gestures, body movements and facial expressions, purely individual in nature, the synchronization and unification of which is achieved through mutual “copying” of the way of performing the “necessary” screams or gestures in the “right situation”. So, food cries ( long-distance food calls) chimpanzees are purely individual, with some dependence also on the situation and the novelty of food (which is reminiscent of a food cry M. sinica). However, when producing a cry together, male chimpanzees begin to imitate the acoustic characteristics of their partner's cry. This achieves a certain unification of calls, the more complete and stable the more often these animals cry together about similar types of food (that is, the closer the social connection between them, the more often they cooperate in searching for food in similar ways, etc.).

Since the nature of the cry and the degree of its unification with other individuals is a marker of the closeness of social interaction between animals, different males cry differently depending on with whom exactly. This leads, on the one hand, to a significant diversity of cries, on the other hand, to a unification that marks existing social alliances, but can be flexibly rearranged with any transformation of the group structure. Thus, individuals are informed about all significant restructuring of the structure of social connections (Mittani, Brandt, 1994).

As observations show, other individuals are well oriented to the structure of calls and the nature of gesticulations of individuals, using them as a marker of changes in the animal’s social connections with individuals from the immediate environment (strength, closeness, stability of connections, dominant or subordinate position, Goodall, 1992). Orangutans do the same thing. Pongo pygmaeus. To resume interrupted communication: they accurately reproduce the partner’s signals if they “understand” its meaning and the situation in connection with which it was issued, but modify it if the meaning of the corresponding gestures and cries is incomprehensible (unknown), or ignorance of the circumstances in which it was reproduced (Leaves, 2007).

That is, an ethological observer, among the sounds or expressions of anthropoids, can always identify elements that in a certain period of time would be both “formalized” and “endowed with meaning” for all members of the group.

But these elements are not constant, their “endowment” changes purely situationally and dynamically throughout the life of the group, that is, “in themselves” they are “formless” and “semantically empty” (signals ad hoc). Although the plastic behavior of an animal (including vocalization) always breaks down into a number of relatively isolated elements reminiscent of demonstrations, upon any lengthy observation it turns out to be unique. tabula rasa, on which the dynamics of the social structure of the group imprints one or another “structure of behavior” with a signaling meaning ad hoc and quickly modifies them.

That's why second line of evidence for the absence of instincts in great apes is associated with failure to find “vervet monkey-type” signaling systems. The latter are based on specific sets of differentiated demonstrations, “denoting” logically alternative categories of objects of the external world and thus, as it were, “naming” them. In addition to them, the same signal “denotes differentiated” behavioral programs that are launched upon interaction with a given external object and/or after receiving a signal about it (Seyfarth et al., 1980; Cheeney, Seyfarth, 1990; Blumstein, 2002; Egnor et al. ., 2004).

It is significant that in situations of danger and anxiety (as well as aggression, sexual arousal, and in all other situations) anthropoids unable to inform partners exactly what danger is threatening, where exactly it comes from, and what should be done in this situation . Their gestures and cries reflect only the degree of anxiety in connection with the situation, they can arouse a similar emotional state in others, force them to pay attention to the situation and, in the presence of relationships that involve social support, encourage them to provide it.

Thus, in groups of chimpanzees, cannibals periodically appear, stealing and eating the young of other monkeys. Sometimes these attempts are successful, sometimes mothers repel them, mobilizing support in the form of friendly males. One of these females was attacked by a cannibal several times and successfully repelled them due to social support. However, the nature of the attack target’s signaling shows that its intense signaling and gestures do not in any way inform the “support group” about what kind of danger is threatening and how best to repel it; it only conveys a state of anxiety and stress in connection with the situation. Arriving males are forced to assess the situation and choose actions themselves ( J. Goodall. Chimpanzees in nature. Behavior. M.: Mir, 1992).

In contrast, the simple signaling system of lower apes (3-4 differentiated calls instead of 18-30 vocalizations in chimpanzees, connected by continuum transitions) easily copes with the task of informing about alternative categories of dangers that are significant for their external world (Zuberbűhler et al., 1997; Zuberbűhler, 2000; Blumstein, 2002; Egnor et al., 2004). Apparently, precisely because it is impossible to accurately indicate the danger posed by cannibals, these chimpanzees calmly exist in groups and, outside of acts of attack on other cubs, are completely tolerated by other individuals. The latter fully recognize these subjects individually, but due to the absence of both species-specific instincts and a “protolanguage”, their actions remain “unnamed”, and, therefore, “unappreciated” by the collective.

That is, in the lower monkeys we see one state of stereotypical forms of behavior, one way of using ritualized demonstrations, exactly corresponding to the “classical” definition of instinct; in anthropoids and humans - another, directly opposite to the first. In fact, chimpanzees and bonobos (unlike vervet monkeys) do not have a specific “language” that solves the problem of “naming” significant situations and objects of the external world, and designating actions that are effective in a given situation. At the same time, in terms of the level of intelligence, ability to learn, to accurately reproduce someone else’s actions in a difficult situation (the same gestures of the “language of the deaf and dumb”), they are quite capable of learning language and using symbols. This has been proven many times by the famous experiments with “talking monkeys”.

Therefore, human language is not a species instinct Homo sapiens, as Chomskyans believe (Pinker, 2004), but is the same product of cultural evolution in communities of primates and protohumans, like tool activity. It has much in common with the latter, including the common neurological substrate of speaking, making tools according to a pattern, and throwing an object accurately at a target. But then even anthropoids (and especially humans) do not have patterns of behavior that correspond to the ethological definition of instinct.

Third line of evidence lack of instincts is associated with a radically different nature of facial expressions (possibly other elements of “body language”) of a person compared to species-specific demonstrations of lower apes and other vertebrates, say, demonstrations of courtship and threat. The latter represent a classic example of instinct, including because the accuracy of the correspondence between stimulus and reaction, the issued demonstration of the individual and the response demonstration of the partner is ensured automatically, due to the mechanism of stimulation of like by like.

The model of “stimulation of like by like” by M.E. Goltsman (1983a) arises from the need to explain the stability/direction of the flow of communication, its specific result in the form of social asymmetry, stable for a certain (predictable) period of time, as well as the differentiation of roles that stabilizes the system -society without any “too strong” statements about the presence of specialized sign systems. Famous dialogue model of communication classical ethologists - a variant of “stimulation of like by like” for the limiting case when the influences that individuals exchange with each other are specialized signals strictly associated with certain situations of the naturally developing process of interaction.

The nature of stimulation of like by like can be explained by the example of interactions between mother and child during the period of “baby babble”, when there is definitely no sign communication (Vinarskaya, 1987). In the first months of a child’s life, some of the communication mechanisms are imprinted. Among them are those “which are a necessary prerequisite for any interaction”: quick and intent glances, approaching movements, smiling, laughter, characteristic sounds of the voice. All these reactions are reinforced by the mother’s behavioral mechanisms, which turn on so unexpectedly and act so unconsciously for the mother herself that the author even makes a “potentiality error” by assuming their innateness.

This is a slowing down of the tone of the mother’s speech in response to the emotional manifestations of the child, an increase in the average frequency of the fundamental tone of the voice due to high frequencies, etc. If we were talking about the dialogue of adults, we could say that the mother translates the speech into the register “for a foreigner.” Actually, “stimulation of like by like” consists of the following: “ The more the physical characteristics of the mother’s emotional statements are similar to the infant’s vocal capabilities, the easier it is for him to imitate her and, consequently, to establish emotional social contact with her, which is characteristic of an early age. The more complete… the contact, the sooner the child’s innate sound reactions begin to acquire national specific features s" (Vinarskaya, 1987: 21 ).

According to M.E. Goltsman (1983a), the main regulator of animal behavior in communities is based on two co-occurring processes: stimulation of behavior by similar behavior of a partner, or, conversely, blocking of this activity. First process: any behavioral act stimulates, i.e. initiates or strengthens exactly the same acts or complementary ones in all those who perceive it. The behavior of an animal has a self-stimulating effect on itself and a stimulating effect on its partners. This influence is carried out simultaneously at the entire set of possible levels of organization of animal behavior in communities. Although the main influence of each behavior parameter (the degree of ritualization of the form of acts, the intensity and expression of actions, the intensity of the rhythm of interactions) falls on the same parameter of behavior of the animal itself and its partners, it also extends to other forms of behavior that are physiologically and motorically related to this one. Second process is based on the opposite property: a behavioral act blocks the occurrence of similar acts in a social partner.

Therefore, the relationships between individuals of different ranks in a structured community are predominantly “competitive” in nature. The high frequency of presentation by dominant individuals of specific complexes of postures, movements and actions that make up the so-called “dominant syndrome” ensures a leading position in the group and at the same time creates a situation where the manifestation of identical forms of behavior in other members of the group is largely suppressed, so that they become into a subordinate position (Goltzman et al., 1977).

Further, the existence of a positive feedback is postulated, allowing both individuals to compare the parameters of their own activity with the parameters of the partner’s action and evaluate the “balance of forces” of opposing flows of stimulation created by the implementation of the behavior of one and the other individual (Goltsman, 1983a; Goltsman et al., 1994; Kruchenkova, 2002).

If the social activity of the partner is “weaker” than the activity of the individual itself, this stimulates the progressive development of the animal’s behavior towards the appearance of more and more expressive and specific elements that have a more intense and long-term impact on the partner. If the partner’s activity is “stronger” than the individual’s own activity, then it suppresses the manifestation of similar elements of behavior in the partner’s activity and “reverses” the development of the latter’s behavior in the direction opposite to the development of the behavior of the stronger partner (Goltsman et al., 1994; Kruchenkova, 2002). For example, in agonistic interactions, the defeated animal moves into submission postures, while the eventual winner continues to display threatening postures.

Further, every behavioral act stimulates in the perceiving individual exactly the same acts (initiating their appearance or enhancing the expression of existing ones) or complementary to them. Any implementation of a certain behavior, and especially ritualized demonstrations, specifically stimulates the partner and at the same time increases the sensitivity of the animal itself to the same type of stimulation from the outside, that is, a self-stimulating effect takes place. The processes of stimulation and self-stimulation turn out to be coupled: here these are two sides of the same coin.

In this case, for all instinctive reactions of the animal, a strong positive correlation is observed between the animal’s ability to perceive signals associated with the corresponding demonstrations and produce them itself.

In any population, there is polymorphism in the ability to encode outgoing signals (associated with the accuracy of reproduction of signal invariants in specific acts of animal demonstration, with the stereotypical performance of species-specific demonstrations), and in the ability to “decipher” the behavior of a partner, highlighting specific forms of signals against the background of a continuum of non-specific non-signal actions. In all species studied in this regard, the ability to produce stereotyped, easily recognizable output displays correlates with a greater ability to differentiate displays in the stream of actions of a partner at the input of the system-organism (Andersson, 1980; Pietz, 1985; Aubin, Joventine, 1997, 1998, 2002).

Human facial expressions, expressing different emotional states, are very similar to demonstrations of courtship and threat of lower apes: both are expressive reactions that have some species-specificity and are performed quite stereotypically. However, here there is no correlation between the ability to send and receive facial signals, and if there is, it is negative. For example, J. T. Lanzetta and R. E. Kleck found that skilled facial senders were very inaccurate in deciphering others' expressions, and vice versa. College students were filmed reacting to red and green lights, the former warning of electric shock.

The same group of students was then shown recordings of other participants' reactions and asked to determine when they were shown a red signal and when they were shown a green signal. Those subjects whose faces most accurately reflected the state they were experiencing worse than others determined this state on the faces of other participants (Lanzetta, Kleck, 1970).

In animals, the execution of their own demonstrations is directly proportional to the sensitivity to similar stimulation of the partner and the ability to classify the opponent’s expressive reactions by the presence/absence of the necessary demonstrations (to which the animal is ready to react). The positive correlation remains, even if the demonstration is reproduced with distortion, the performer is obscured by branches, foliage, etc., precisely due to the instinctive nature of the production and response of signals (Nuechterlein, Storer, 1982; Searby et al., 2004; Evans, Marler, 1995; Hauser , 1996; Peters and Evans, 2003a, b, 2007; Evans and Evans, 2007).

Therefore, a negative correlation in humans is associated with a non-instinctive mechanism of socialization based on the communicative environment in the family and associated learning . In a highly expressive family environment, facial demonstration skills develop well, but since the highly emotional signals of all family members are extremely expressive and very accurate, decoding skills develop poorly due to lack of need. Conversely, in low-expressive families, the skills of expressive expression of emotional states are very poorly developed, but since the need for understanding objectively exists, learning is carried out to more accurately decipher weak signals (Izard, 1971, cited in Izard, 1980).

This assumption was fully confirmed when using the “Family Expressiveness Questionnaire” ( Family Expressiveness Questionnaire) to assess the communication environment. The skill of encoding an emotional state in facial expressions correlates positively with the level of emotionality in relationships and emotional freedom in the family, while the skill of decoding correlates negatively (Halberstadt, 1983, 1986)

And in conclusion - why are people now looking for instincts with the same zeal with which they used to look for an immortal soul? The goal is one - to reconcile with the injustice of the structure of the world, which lies in evil and, despite 1789 and 1917, is not going to get out of there; on the contrary, it is plunging deeper and deeper into evil.

The concept of “basic human instincts” implies an innate predisposition in specific situations to perform certain actions or avoid certain actions. This desire may not be realized in all cases. In some situations, social prohibitions or other factors may interfere. However, in this case, the desire and the emotion that reinforces it can be isolated and defined.

It should be noted that the traditional description, characterizing instincts as a complex of complex innate reactions in the body, formed mainly in an almost unchanged form as a response to internal or external stimuli, is almost not applicable to people. This is mainly due to the lack in humans of fixed types of actions that have been described in animals. An exception can be made only for facial expressions, gestures, and postures, which, as it turns out, are largely inherited.

Modern researchers studying innate programs prefer to use the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies in behavior (ESSB). This term was first introduced by M. Smith.

Evolutionarily stable are those behavioral strategies in which the species and the individual, against the background of selective pressure and modification, bring the greatest adaptive benefits.

Human instincts are divided into three main categories.

The first includes life's innate predispositions. In this case, they ensure the safety of the individual’s life. These human instincts are endowed with certain characteristic features:

A decrease in an individual’s chances of survival is caused by dissatisfaction of the corresponding need;

There is no practical need for another individual to satisfy one or another need.

  1. Every normal individual has an innate motivation to avoid unsafe situations.
  2. Evolutionary Many people have an innate fear of snakes, the dark, insects, and strangers (particularly when they are larger or in a group). A person may also be afraid of heights, rats, blood, mice, the sick, predators, or being bitten or eaten.
  3. Food aversions or cravings. Genetically, people may have a predisposition to mineralized, salty, high-calorie foods. Some individuals feel the need to try new, unfamiliar food. Many people are predisposed to eating seeds, snacks, and chewing gum.
  4. Thermoregulation.
  5. Wakefulness and sleep.
  6. Brachiation (flight). At the same time, some people are attracted by the view from above, others, when in danger, try to climb higher, and still others are engaged in activities related to the air (parachute jumping, aviation).
  7. Excreta.
  8. Collecting (gathering).
  9. Biological clocks and rhythms.

10. Saving your energy (rest).

  1. Instinct of procreation.
  2. Parental behavior.
  3. Dominance (submission), appeasement and aggression.
  4. Territorial instincts.
  5. Group behavior and others.

The third category includes innate programs. These human instincts are not associated with species or individual adaptation to reality. These programs are aimed at the future. These innate predispositions are not derived from those described above, but exist independently. These, in particular, include:

  1. Instinct of learning.
  2. Games.
  3. Imitation.
  4. Preferences in art.
  5. Freedom (overcoming obstacles) and others.

Two forces struggle in man: biological and social. The game of reason, social norms and instincts will never end. The instinct of self-preservation, protection, reproduction, maternal instinct and many others are against education and culture. What are instincts, can they be controlled? Find out from the article.

Instinct is an innate behavior, a way of responding to specific environmental conditions. Animals have many innate patterns of behavior: walking, hunting, feeding offspring, and speech interaction characteristic of the species. Do humans have instincts? A child needs to be taught everything: to walk, to talk, to hold a spoon. And these are just the basic skills.

Birds, for example, at a subconscious level know how to build nests. Do any of the newborn children know what rent is, or how to build a house? No, although instinct would be useful.

Instinct is the genetic program of a biological species, embedded in the individual’s psyche at birth. Think about whether people are given something at birth that is characteristic only of the species Homo sapiens. No. Without the care, attention and help of adults, it will die within 24 hours.

Instincts are patterns of behavior that do not need to be taught. A person must be taught everything that is characteristic of his species.

However, humans retain some animal instincts. Babies can crawl and eat food with their hands. True, it is unlikely that they will live to this point without their mother. If parents do not take care of the child, then he remains an animal. In psychological and pedagogical science they are called Mowgli children.

Reflexes

Reflex is a mechanism for realizing instinct. In essence, instinct is a complex of unconditioned reflexes. A person is given 15 reflexes at birth. They are divided into three groups: oral, motor, grasping. Most of them die off during the first year of a child's life.

Other reflexes – conditioned, acquired as a result of learning – become vitally important. We look around when crossing the road, not because of the instinct of self-preservation, but because we have been taught. We pull our hand away from the hot kettle because we once got burned.

And the mind also comes into play. People understand that it is not advisable to give birth every year. And in general, many people prefer career and personal growth. The social part suppresses instincts.

Of the unconditional instincts, the most influential instinct remains only the “herd” instinct. Human infection is susceptible to a number of mechanisms, including infection and imitation. A sense of community or herdism can turn a group into a chaotic crowd and deprive a person of individuality.

Biological and social in man

In relation to humans, it is customary to speak not about instincts, but about species memory. It can be genetic, passed on from generation to generation, and cultural - the heritage of society.

If some instincts are present, for example, aggression, sexuality, then society suppresses them. Thus, monogamy is the result of personal cultivation.

Animal instincts in a person are activated when the primary biological ones are unsatisfied: food, safety, sleep, housing, sex. Of course, consciousness, learned norms, values, and culture begin to fight instincts.

According to the theory of William McDougall, a person retains several instincts:

  • escape at ;
  • disgust, rejection;
  • anger, often with fear;
  • embarrassment;
  • inspiration;
  • parental;
  • food;
  • gregarious.

Why then, for example, does not the maternal instinct arise in all women? Psychotherapists claim that feeding a child and communicating with him in the first day after birth triggers the maternal instinct. If the contact happened later, then the instinct will not manifest itself. It is likely that other instincts also manifest themselves under certain conditions.

In other theories, the classification of human instincts is supplemented by the following types:

  • procreation;
  • dominance;
  • study;
  • Liberty.

In my opinion, a person has three main instincts.

Three main human instincts

During the development process, a person retains 3 main instincts:

  • sexual,
  • power,
  • self-preservation.

These points are used by the media for consciousness. Remember what is often emphasized in advertising: success, safety, wealth, attractiveness.

In the process of socialization, the instinct of sexuality and power is suppressed. The instinct of self-preservation is cultivated. But aren't these three types related to each other? Self-preservation is both procreation, sexual self-realization, and professional development. So there are still three supporting directions.

The instinct of self-preservation is based on fear. This is also successfully used by the media. Have you noticed how many negative reports there are in the news? Is everything really that bad in the world? No. This is control of human instincts, intimidation. Fear slows down and fetters your arms and legs.

But the instinct of power and sex motivates, forces you to move forward and develop. That is why, when meeting people, they are ready to move mountains for a potential partner. Or at work, seeing the prospects of management, they rush forward.

Often the instincts for power and sex take over, dulling the third main instinct. However, not all so simple. Every instinct harbors fear. A person driven only by instincts, thinking irrationally, ultimately dies.

Instinct controls a person. Creates the ground for outside manipulation. Freud also said that the world is ruled by the thirst for power, sex and hunger. In my opinion, even now people’s activity always comes down to these three points.

Instincts are confused with reflexes (conditioned and unconditioned) and innate needs. The last two concepts are applicable to humans, but instincts are not:

Here's a recent question about animals:

Or, for example, a review article:

I will quote about the most popular one, about the instinct of self-preservation:

So what happens? Are expressions like “instinct of self-preservation” incorrect? What then can we call the “automatic” withdrawal of a hand from a hot stove or fire?! Yes, absolutely right, a person has an innate NEED for self-preservation. But we cannot call this an instinct, since we do not have the corresponding FKD, that is, an innate program of motor activity that would satisfy this need. Having been pricked or burned, we withdraw our hand - but this is NOT an INSTINCT, but just a REFLEX (unconditioned) TO PAINFUL IRRITATION. In general, we have a lot of protective unconditioned reflexes, for example, the blink reflex, coughing, sneezing, vomiting. But these are the simplest standard reflexes. All other threats to the integrity of the body cause only such reactions that we acquire during the learning process.

Here's a good example. Reproduction is a stronger theme than avoiding death. If you have multiplied, then your life is no longer important, selection pressure is weaker here.

Doubts arise simply by remembering all sorts of childfree people and simply the many people who are unable to find a partner. Is this instinct in humans? Or is it just an innate need without a fixed set of actions that ensures success for any male guppy fish*?

*Danced, shook his fins in a special way, welcome to mate if the other did not drive him away. But the other one will also definitely dance, without dance there is no love. The female simply will not “read” him as a male.

And what we see in the great apes:

The Harlows raised 55 monkeys without their mothers. When they became sexually mature, only one monkey showed interest in a sexual partner. Among 90 other monkeys raised with the help of a dummy, only 4 became parents, but they also treated their babies very poorly. Some of them spent all their time sitting in one place, in complete indifference to others. Others took strange positions or wriggled unnaturally. The lack of maternal care left an imprint on them for life.
The evolution of instincts among vertebrates is a gradual weakening of their formative influence and replacement by elements of experience. With the progressive development of an animal's individuality, instinct is replaced by stereotypes where the reaction should be rigid and tough, by learning and intelligence where and when a flexible response to the situation is necessary. Stereotypical and ritual forms of behavior are conservative and rigid, “intellectual” forms are flexible and easy to improve, but both are developed by the social environment - the first within the framework of ratiomorphic processes, the second through the creation of situation concepts.

This is called culture.

Also see comments to Lisa Nesser's answer.

[Although, to tell the truth, a person still has one single instinct, which was discovered by Irenius Eibl-Eibesfeldt, a student of K. Lorenz. When we meet a person we like, we not only smile and part our lips, but our eyebrows also involuntarily raise. This movement, which lasts 1/6 of a second, was recorded by Eibl-Eibesfeldt on film in people of different races. He conducted most of his research in the wild corners of the planet, among tribes that do not know not only television, but also radio, and have rare and superficial contacts with their neighbors. Thus, eyebrow raising could not have been shaped by imitation learning. The main argument was the behavior of children blind from birth. The voice of a person they like also raises their eyebrows, and for the same 150 milliseconds.]